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CAN A CITIZENS’ COMMISSION HELP
REPAIR CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT?
LESSONS FROM LOCAL CHARTER REFORM
Raphael J. Sonenshein*
While there is widespread agreement that there is a crisis of
governance in California, there is little consensus on what institutional
structure would best facilitate useful reform. Although the idea of a
constitutional convention captured the imagination of the reform
community, it failed to generate enough financial and political support
to be implemented. The citizens’ commission, another model of reform,
has been largely ignored. Yet hundreds of municipal reforms have
widely and successfully used the commission model over the past
century. Some state constitutional reforms outside California have
successfully used such commissions. Further, the legendary U.S.
Constitutional Convention of 1787 more closely fits the definition of a
commission than a convention. The commission model of governmental
reform is much less exciting than a constitutional convention but for
that very reason it reduces the initial risk of undertaking such an effort,
a risk that is likely to prove fatal to reform. The low profile of citizen
commissions allows a thorough airing of issues and the development of
the sort of credibility that may give its recommendations surprising
force. California may look to the structures of Florida and Utah—states
in which permanent constitutional reform commissions have legal
standing—as models of how California could steadily and effectively
work toward a solution in a manner that both reduces the immediate
political risk to all affected interests and leaves open the chance for
long-term reform. While California’s attempt at reform by commission
failed in 1996, there are lessons from that experience that can make
success more likely.

* Chair, Division of Politics, Administration, and Justice, California State University,
Fullerton. Based on a presentation at “Rebooting California: Initiatives, Conventions and
Government Reform,” Loyola Law School Los Angeles, September 27, 2010.

637

638

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:637

“I don’t get the big deal. In my city, if we had these kinds of
problems, we’d appoint a charter reform commission made
up of our most respected citizens. They’d go off and study
it, and come back with recommendations, and then we’d
vote on it and fix the problem.”
—Anonymous attendee at a book forum on
California’s constitution, California State
University, Fullerton, September 16, 2010
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is widespread agreement that California’s
governance structure is broken, 1 there is a woeful lack of agreement
on practical ways to fix the system.
Reforming governmental structures, even when there is
widespread acknowledgement that the status quo does not work,
presents complicated political and design challenges. Interest groups
and politicians scan the horizon for changes that may affect them.
They often feel safer with the existing system, which they have
learned to navigate, rather than with a new system that might force
them to learn the ropes all over again. And how can they trust
whoever has the power to propose and implement reforms?
Reform is a risk. As appealing as any design for new
governmental structures may be, reform changes the rules. And
changing the rules may change who gets power. 2 Reform may also
jeopardize deeply held beliefs (such as in equal rights and civil
liberties) that current arrangements guarantee. Reformers, therefore,
must consider how to get the voters and powerful interest groups to

1. The belief that California has major structural problems has become widespread since
budget gridlock became chronic over the last decade. E.g., California: The Ungovernable State,
ECONOMIST, May 14, 2009. Several citizen organizations emerged to argue for a fundamental
overhaul, including Repair California and California Forward. See JOE MATHEWS & MARK
PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE THE GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN
FIX IT (2010) (describing a recent example of a program for structural change); Bruce E. Cain &
Roger G. Noll, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE
GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 1 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds.,
1995); Vladimir Kogan, Lessons from Recent State Constitutional Conventions, CAL. J. POL. &
POL’Y, 2010, at 1, 5–6; Editorial, The Big Fix, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at A34.
2. See Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L.
& POL’Y SYMP. 53, 66 (1996); see, e.g., Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to
Win the Game: The Middle-Class Regimes of Municipal Reformers, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 691, 693
(1999).
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even consider reform. Some reforms, such as term limits, 3 are
popular enough that they can overcome such resistance, but most
reforms lack that sort of popular support. 4 Reform requires a political
strategy in the broadest sense—namely a plan to get reform on the
agenda, to develop credible proposals, and then to get reforms
implemented.
A strategy that leads with risk will likely fail. For example, if
there is too great a perceived danger of an ill-advised reform at the
outset, powerful interest groups and the voting public will kill it in its
infancy. Conversely, a strategy that is too modest, one that reduces
risk so much that the reform proposes no significant improvements,
is a waste of time. 5 The key is to develop a process that properly
limits the initial risk of undertaking change and then generates the
credibility and political strength to implement significant, useful
reforms.
The mechanism for reform that has garnered the most attention
in California is the constitutional convention. 6 There is no wellestablished model for a convention. However, we can rely on past
experience to highlight a convention’s distinctive features. 7 First, a
convention has roots in popular representation. 8 The delegates are so

3. Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE,
supra note 1, at 296 (“In fact, state legislative term limit laws have passed by popularly initiated
measures in 16 states, while none have been passed by the state legislatures themselves.”).
4. Id.
5. See David K. Hamilton, Lay Local Government Charter-Writing Commissions, 14 ST. &
LOC. GOV’T REV. 124, 126 (1982).
6. The idea for a constitutional convention as a vehicle for addressing California’s modern
crisis is relatively new. See, e.g., MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 1, at 14 (“[T]he Bay Area
Council, a policy group backed by businesses such as Google. . . .suggested that the state’s
operating system needed a complete rewrite.”); see Raphael J. Sonenshein, What Charter Reform
Commissions Can Teach Us About a Proposed Constitutional Convention in California, CAL. J.
POL. & POL’Y, 2010, at 1, 1; Jim Wunderman, California’s Government Has Failed Us, S.F.
CHRON.
(Aug. 21,
2008),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-08-21/opinion/17123410_1_
constitutional-convention-new-government-california-constitutional-revision-commission
(proposing that a constitutional convention be called for that purpose).
7. See C.L.W., Jr., Note, State Constitutional Change: The Constitutional Convention, 54
VA. L. REV. 995, 995–1030 (1968) (providing a thorough analysis of the dynamics of a state
constitutional convention).
8. See NEW AM. FOUND., CRUCIAL DETAILS OF A CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION: DELEGATION SELECTION METHODS, SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION, PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
(2009),
available
at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/
ConCon_details.pdf.
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named because the people delegate authority to them. 9 Even
appointed delegates are chosen based on representational criteria
(e.g., union members, women, young people, and racial and ethnic
minorities). 10
Second, a convention has actual authority, because it acts as a
mechanism to achieve reform and reach decisions. 11 Some decisions
are implemented directly, such as the national nominating
convention’s choice of the party’s presidential and vice presidential
candidates. 12 Other decisions may be implemented indirectly, such as
the creation of ballot measures or proposals for the legislature. 13
A convention’s legitimacy derives from its popular roots.
Because the people select the members, or the members are
appointed to represent specific segments of the populace, the
convention’s recommendations should carry great authority.
A convention is both the most exciting and the riskiest model of
governmental reform. It hearkens back to the U.S. Constitutional
Convention of 1787, the Big Bang of governmental reform. 14 If the
people elect the delegates or if the appointment of delegates is meant
to ensure representation from a wide variety of constituencies, then
the people should and likely will feel some connection to the
convention itself. A convention will generate tremendous media
coverage. The delegates will consider themselves to be delegates

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id. at 2.
See id. at 3.
See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1.
See NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 8, at 8.
See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1.
See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 52–63 (The Macmillan Company 1921) (discussing how
economic interests may have found the proposed national government advantageous);
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 1–15 (Back Bay Books 1986)
(describing the origins of the U.S. Constitutional Convention); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1–42 (1st ed. 1913) (giving background on the
calling of the U.S. Constitutional Convention and the convention’s members); EDMUND S.
MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763–89 (3d ed. 1956) (describing how the colonists’
immediate needs led to their search for constitutional principles, eventually leading to the
Revolutionary War); Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing how the appeal of the U.S.
Constitutional Convention of 1787 may fuel excitement about having a constitutional convention
in California).
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more than trustees and may consider themselves to be elected
officials in their own right. 15
The flip side of excitement is risk. Elected or appointed
delegates may well believe that once the convention opens, they are
free to make their own rules. For example, suppose a state’s voters
call a convention strictly to address state budget rules. One or more
delegates might well insist that the state constitution should forbid
the budget from including abortion funds or require that it guarantee
a minimum level of income for all state residents. Once created, a
convention may be hard to rein in.
Because of the excitement and authority associated with a
convention, activist groups and politicians would have an urgent
interest in influencing who becomes a delegate and what the
delegates decide. They would watch carefully as the convention
develops, from its design to its selection of delegates to its leadership
choices to its handling of individual issues. The potential excitement
and risk of a convention may also account for the intense media
interest in a convention. 16 After all, who would not want to cover a
convention that might go anywhere and do anything? 17 Such a
convention could be easily distinguished from the contemporary
presidential convention, where the near certainty of the result helps
account for its declining television coverage. 18
And yet, despite the excitement, the convention idea has failed
to take hold in California. In 2009, advocates of a California
convention halted their plan to gather signatures for a convention
ballot measure, citing a lack of funding. 19 While the lack of funding
was the most obvious cause of the convention proposal’s withdrawal,
there had also been little attention to the many organizational issues

15. This well-known distinction in political science is between legislators who see
themselves as delegates sent to carry out the wishes of their constituents and trustees who view
their role as using their own judgment in the best interests of the community. The latter model is
associated with Edmund Burke.
16. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1; see also The Big Fix, supra note 1, at A34 (providing
reasons why California needs a constitutional convention to solve its statewide problems).
17. It is reasonable to infer that the decreased interest of national media in covering
presidential nominating conventions is related to the certainty of the outcome and the resulting
scripting of the event. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 62.
18. See id.
19. Evan Halper & Anthony York, California Reform Bid Called Off, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2010, at AA2.
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that would impede the creation of an effective deliberative body
under the convention model. 20
Those who blame the convention organizers for the failure of the
convention model to take hold in California should consider the
difficulty of the task. California is hardly alone, as the road to
conventions is often too steep to climb. The imagined benefits are
distant and open to debate, while the immediate risks are
overpowering and obvious. Pre-1982, successful conventions were
limited in their scope to prevent the risk of a runaway convention. 21
These factors may explain why in recent years conventions have
failed to get off the ground. Since 1990, no state electorate has
adopted a proposal to call a constitutional convention; fourteen
proposals failed at the polls. 22 Gerald Benjamin and Thomas Gais
have labeled this contemporary decline of state conventions,
following what was a long history of conventions,
“conventionphobia.” 23
The U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787 is, of course, the
mother of all reform efforts. This small meeting began with fifty-five
members and ended with thirty-nine, managed to overturn the
Articles of Confederation, 24 and created a new constitution that has
stood the test of time. It has the image of the quintessential
convention. 25 But repeat performances are unlikely. The
Constitution’s amendment process is so onerous that few changes
have been made since 1787. 26 It is difficult to grasp how the 1787
experience could translate directly to the California of today.

20. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing that better organization of time, staff, and
agenda will help ensure successful constitutional reform).
21. See Kogan, supra note 1, at 3–4; see also Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 53, 54–57
(discussing “conventionphobia at the national level”).
22. Kogan, supra note 1, at 5.
23. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 69.
24. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 3.
25. See id. at 1.
26. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 56.
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II. SO SHALL WE GIVE UP?
With the recent collapse of the convention option, California’s
reformers have fallen into despair. 27 But this hopelessness is
unfounded. If one tool does not work, pick up another.
Where should we look for help? A constitutional system that
grants formal authority only to the national and state governments
naturally inclines us to look only to these levels for models of
reform. In so doing, state reformers limit themselves to levels of
government that have not been particularly successful in designing
and sharing the best practices of restructuring government. In
essence, reformers have missed an important source of experience:
the local level.
Justice Louis D. Brandeis eloquently described the creative role
of the states in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann:
There must be power in the States and the Nation to
remould, through experimentation, our economic practices
and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs. . . . To stay experimentation in things social and
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. 28
This concept of states as “laboratories of democracy” has
endured as a magnificent justification for states in the federal system.
But it would be incorrect to consider states to be laboratories of
reform in which structural innovations for governance are created,
tested, and disseminated in an ongoing debate about best practices.
At the state level, reform has been overshadowed by policy
debates. 29 While there is much more flexibility and much less
sanctity in state constitutions than in the federal constitution, 30 the
27. See Halper & York, supra note 19 (“There appears to be no excitement out there for
these rather complicated reforms. . . . It is hard to go to the public with these ethereal ideas and
have them understand what you are talking about.”).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 70.
30. See id. at 62–67.
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states have not developed structural reform to the same extent as
America’s local governments. 31
III. LOOKING DOWN FOR REFORM
Meanwhile, percolating below the federal and state levels we
find a level of government that is literally teeming with structural
reform efforts, many of which have been successful. America’s real
laboratories of reform are the local governments that have
proliferated throughout the nation for more than a century. Local
government is easily to overlook. Municipal home rule arrived
relatively late to American government, roughly a century after the
nation’s founding, 32 and local government is the runt of the
governmental litter.
For the first century of American government, localities had
little scope to design and structure their own governments. 33 They
were considered to be creatures of state governments, having only as
much authority as states would grant. 34 “Dillon’s Rule,” a decision
named after a state court judge in Iowa, asserted that state
government profoundly limited local governments. 35 Dillon wrote in
1872:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers, and no others: First those granted in
express words; second those necessarily or fairly implied in
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and

31. Compare id. at 62–63 (“There have been 234 constitutional conventions in American
states, territories, and the District of Columbia. The states have functioned under 146 separate
constitutions. In the eight years between 1986 and 1993, 1007 amendments were offered to
documents currently in force. Of these, 708 passed.”), with Hamilton, supra note 5, at 124
(“Approximately three-fourths of the states now allow local governments some discretion in
framing their own charters. This allowance has produced a substantial increase in local
government charter-writing activity. For example, of the 84 home rule counties that adopted new
charters through 1980, 56 had been written since 1965 and 39 since 1970.” (citations omitted)).
32. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2009).
33. See id.; Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, 21 POL. SCI. Q. 77, 79–81 (1906).
34. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 32, at 1340.
35. See, e.g., City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1109–13
(1980) (discussing the philosophical background of Dillon’s doctrine).
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purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but
indispensable. 36
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, state governments
began to grant home rule authority to local governments. 37
California, in fact, was one of the first states to grant home rule. 38
Missouri was first in 1875, 39 followed by California in 1879. 40 The
vehicle for home rule was the city charter. The voters adopted a
document that became the community’s governing constitution. 41
With the adoption of a new city charter, a city became the author
of its own destiny. Charter cities, in contrast to “general law” cities,
could select their form of government among many models and had
greater freedom to contract and to implement other business
practices. For instance, they could enshrine pension rules beyond the
reach of the city council and mayor by putting them in the charter. 42
And, most importantly for this Article, charters themselves could be
changed through a process of charter reform. 43 Today, roughly a
quarter of all incorporated cities in California operate as charter
cities. 44
In stark contrast to the federal and state levels, reform has
constantly preoccupied local governments. To some degree, much of

36. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448–50
(5th ed. 1911)
37. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 32, at 1341; David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2387–97 (2003) (stating that Missouri was the first state to grant home
rule, in 1875; California followed in 1879); Goodnow, supra note 33, at 84.
38. See Barron, supra note 37, at 2298.
39. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 32, at 1371 n.160.
40. Barron, supra note 37, at 2298.
41. See id. at 2295; John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California, 30 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 5 (1941).
42. See Ted Hunt, The Problem with Charter Cities, AM. POLICE BEAT,
http://www.apbweb.com/news/9-opinion-editorial/1456-the-problem-with-charter-cities.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2010).
43. See RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, THE CITY AT STAKE: SECESSION, REFORM, AND THE
BATTLE FOR LOS ANGELES 5 (2004) (“A number of cities have reformed their charters as a
method to reexamine the effectiveness and responsiveness of governing institutions.”). Over time,
some of the comparative advantages of charter cities have been eroded as states have given
greater flexibility to general law cities. For a list of charter cities in California, see Charter Cities
List, League of Cal. Cities, http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?zone=locc&previewStory=26279
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
44. Facts At A Glance (2010), LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, http://www.cacities.org/
index.jsp?zone=locc&previewStory=53 (last updated Nov. 30, 2010) (noting that 120 of 481
California cities are charter cities).
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urban politics could be understood as the conflict between political
machines and bosses on the one hand, and urban reformers on the
other. 45 Many working class leaders believed that the reformers only
wished to substitute middle class leaders for themselves, and their
suspicions were often correct. 46 But urban reform today is such a
powerful symbol that it is not only the property of “do gooders” and
middle class “morning glories” but is also contested in city politics
by a wide variety of interest groups. 47 Some structural reforms, such
as the adoption of district elections instead of at-large elections, were
explicitly designed to enhance minority representation. 48
Urban reform, built on the energy of the Progressive movement,
generated a massive array of research, institutions, journals, activists,
and experiences. 49 In 1899, the National Municipal League (now the
National Civic League) published the first edition of the Model City
Charter. 50 In 2003, the National Civic League published its eighth
edition. 51 With the Model City Charter, a new or experienced city
and its charter commission could examine the city’s charter in light
of the views of reformers nationwide—views that reflected
competing schools of thought. 52 Traditionally, most reformers
emphasized the council-manager system, but in recent years, there
has been more backing for strong mayors. 53 Other organizations,
such as the Strong Mayor-Council Institute, challenged reformers’
45. See Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to Win the Game: The MiddleClass Regimes of Municipal Reformers, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 691, 692 (1999).
46. See id. at 703.
47. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at 6 (“The battle today is really not between the
reformers and the party regulars. It is between competing visions of urban reform: for example,
businesslike efficiency weighed against greater representation for minorities.”).
48. Compare Susan Welch, The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of
Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL. 1050, 1050 (1990) (finding that at-large elections represent
blacks more in 1990 than they did a decade prior, but that district elections still represent blacks
better than at-large elections; however, district elections do not necessarily create more equal
representation for Hispanics), with Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and
Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43
J. POL. 982, 998 (1981) (observing that current changes from at-large to single-member-district
elections enhance minority representation in various political subdivisions).
49. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at 19.
50. NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, MODEL CITY CHARTER viii (8th ed. 2003).
51. Id. at i.
52. See generally id. at vii–xiv (providing background on the origins and growth of the
Model City Charter and its use by municipalities).
53. James H. Svara, Do We Still Need Model Charters? The Meaning and Relevance of
Reform in the Twenty-First Century, 90 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 19, 20–21 (2001).
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bias toward the council manager system. 54 The public administration
literature has addressed comparisons between forms of local
government, with detailed assessments of the impact of structure on
spending, economic equality, business development, and
representation. 55
Every five years, the International City/County Management
Association (ICMA) conducts a survey of cities and their municipal
structures. In the five years preceding the 2001 report, 10 percent of
all cities reported attempting structural reform. 56 In the five years
preceding the 2006 report, 8.8 percent of cities reported the same
activity. 57 Of these attempts, nearly half were successful at the ballot
box. 58
Although the percentages may seem low, the absolute numbers
of successful reforms are fairly impressive. Within the broad
numbers lies evidence that local government offers an array of
reform models, both in process and in outcome.

54. See STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INST., http://strongmayorcouncil.org/home.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2010).
55. See generally David R. Morgan & John P. Pelissero, Urban Policy: Does Political
Structure Matter?, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 999, 999–1006 (1980) (describing a study that found
that reformed cities did not change fiscal behavior).
56. INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, MUNICIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, 2001, at 2
(2001) [hereinafter ICMA 2001], available at http://lawschool.westlaw.com/Files/Download/
5492974/iCMA.%202002.%20Municipal%20Form%20of%20Government%202001.pdf (listing
aggregate survey results).
57. INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, MUNICIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, 2006: TRENDS
IN STRUCTURE, RESPONSIBILITY, AND COMPOSITION 3 (2006) [hereinafter IMCA 2006],
available at http://icma.org/Documents/Document/Document/664 (listing aggregate survey
results).
58. Id.
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2001 Report
5 years
preceding
Surveys sent
7867
Responses
4244
Charter cities
54.6 (%)
Reform efforts
10.0 (%)
Success rates (percentage):
At large to district
34.8
District to at large
no data
Mixed system
34.3
Changed mix
42.9
Increase members
58.3
Decrease members
50.0
Method of election of top elected
39.5
Increase powers of top elected
41.7
Decrease in powers of top
43.8
elected
Add professional administrator
71.8
Eliminate professional
28.1
administrator
Change appointment of admin.
16.7
Change form of government
45.0
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2006 Report
5 years
preceding
8278
3864
56.9
8.8
42.1
47.8
45.0
36.8
58.6
54.5
55.9
41.7
55.6
71.8
29.4
0
44.9

IV. THE CHARTER REFORM COMMISSION
Charter reform requires an institutional mechanism. A charter
reform commission, whether appointed or elected, is the preferred
mechanism. 60 A commission is not required to amend a city charter
because the city council—or the voters, where state law allows—can
normally place any revisions on the ballot. But commissions have
emerged as a popular means to achieve reform. 61

59. Id.; IMCA 2001.
60. See Raphael J. Sonenshein, What Charter Reform Commissions Can Teach Us About a
Proposed Constitutional Convention in California, CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y, Jan. 2010, at 1, 2.
61. See id.
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In fact, the citizens’ commission has been one of the great
American innovations. For more than a century, American
government has benefited from commissions that have weighed
issues and offered recommendations. 62 Commissions have generated
credibility outside or alongside the political process. 63 Well-known
examples include the Kerner Commission that famously concluded
that America was becoming two nations—one black, one white—
after the 1960s riots; 64 the Christopher Commission that generated
successful reforms of the Los Angeles Police Department after the
Rodney King beating; 65 the 9/11 Commission following the 2001
attacks; 66 and the Knapp Commission on police corruption in New
York City. 67
The definition of a commission, like that of a convention, must
be distilled from experience. By common usage and practice, a
commission is a body of citizens separate from an elected executive
or legislature that is tasked with analyzing an issue and proposing
solutions either to a legislative body, an executive, or the voters. 68 A
commission may be either elected or appointed. 69 If elected, a charter

62. See, e.g., id.
63. See Serge Grossman & Michael Simon, And Congress Shall Know the Truth: The
Pressing Need for Restructuring Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 435, 436 (2008) (alongside the political process); Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make
Redistricters More Accountable to the People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 37, 40–42 (2010) (outside the political process); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots
Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 709, 719–20 (2000)
(outside the political process).
64. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90
B.U. L. REV. 255, 302 (2010).
65. See id.
66. Bennie G. Thompson, A Legislative Prescription for Confronting 21st-Century Risks to
the Homeland, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 281–82 (2010).
67. Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological
and Humanitarian Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17, 27 (2009).
68. See Salsich, Jr., supra note 63, at 712 (“[Neighborhood collaborative planning] can,
though, be a useful technique for giving residents a feeling that they have a stake in the outcome
of decisions that may be made about their community, as well as a way to participate in the
decision-making process.”); see Huefner, supra note 63, at 40–42 (describing a 2005 redistricting
commission in California); see also NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, GUIDE FOR CHARTER COMMISSIONS 6
(5th ed. 1991) (“The charter commission, a distinctly American contribution to the art and
practice of local government . . . has a unique and important service to perform. Like a
constitutional convention at the state or national level, it investigates the existing government and
charter . . . . Free from the necessity of engaging in actual government and party strife, it can turn
its full attention to the improvement of governmental machinery.”).
69. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 124.
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reform commission bears some resemblance to a convention. Indeed,
elected charter reform commissioners behave quite differently from
appointed ones. 70 In some states, like Michigan, elected commissions
predominate. 71 Appointed commissions are more likely to be
described as “blue ribbon” panels. 72
The nation’s two largest cities, New York City and Los Angeles,
completed major charter reforms in recent decades. 73 In the late
1980s, New York City faced a governance crisis because a federal
court ruled the Board of Estimate was in violation of one person, one
vote. 74 The city established two successive charter reform
commissions that recommended major changes to the city’s
governance; these recommendations were adopted by the voters.. 75
The commissions successfully navigated New York City’s intense
and complex politics. 76 The authors of the changes prepared several
publications that both provided details about the mechanics and
politics of reform as well as some advice to other charter
commissions. 77
In California, major charter reforms were completed in recent
decades in San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland, and San Diego. 78 In
70. Id. at 125–26.
71. See Susan B. Hannah, Writing Home-Rule Charters in Michigan: Current Practices in
Constitution Making, 84 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 140, 141–42 (1995).
72. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 126.
73. Raphael J. Sonenshein, Gotham on Our Minds: New York City in the Los Angeles
Charter Reform of 1996–1999, in NEW YORK & LOS ANGELES: POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND
CULTURE 301 (David Halle ed., 2003)
74. See Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin, The Reemergence of Municipal Reform, in
RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL
REFORM 1, 3 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989); Joseph P. Viteritti, The Tradition
of Municipal Reform: Charter Revision in Historical Context, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW
YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM, supra, at 16, 29;
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story
of New York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 729, 731–32 (1998).
75. See Mauro & Benjamin, supra note 74, at 5–7.
76. See id. at 6–7.
77. See generally id. (focusing on the most significant and controversial issues that
confronted the Schwarz Charter Revision Commission and the Ravitch Commission that
preceded it).
78. In 1998, Oakland voters approved a charter change to increase the authority of the
mayor. Brown v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 2000).
An attempt by the mayor of Sacramento to increase mayoral authority failed to win council
approval to go the ballot in 2010. Ryan Lillis, Kevin Johnson Won’t Raise Strong-Mayor Issue
Until Next Year or 2012, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 13, 2010), http://blogs.sacbee.com/
capitolalertlatest/2010/04/kevin-johnson-wont-raise-stron.html. Voters in San Diego replaced
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Los Angeles, pressure from the San Fernando Valley for secession
from the city led to the creation of two competing charter reform
commissions, one elected and one appointed. 79 After two years of
competition, they agreed on a single charter, persuaded the city
council to place it on the ballot, and received voter endorsement in
1999. 80
At any given time, an Internet search turns up functioning
charter reform commissions in cities of all sizes around the country.
The commissions borrow from each other, conduct meetings and
hearings in their own communities, and develop recommendations.
Some succeed and some fail. 81 The charter reform commission is a
core element of a culture of reform at the local level.
To get an idea of how much more widespread charter reform
commissions have been than state constitutional conventions since
1990, consider my own experience: since 1997, I have been the
principal staff person for appointed charter reform commissions in
Los Angeles, Glendale, Burbank, Culver City, and Huntington
Beach, all within a relatively narrow corridor of Los Angeles and
Orange Counties. During that same period of time, voters have not
approved a single state constitutional convention. . And of course my
own experience represents only a tiny sliver of the wide range of
local charter commissions to be found in cities throughout the nation
during the same period.
Commissions are so ingrained in the charter reform process that
books have been written to guide commissioners in their duties. 82
The sharing of experience is a common feature in local charter
reform. When I took my position in Los Angeles, I contacted Eric
Lane, who had been the executive director of the New York City
charter reform ten years earlier. The final report and the official

their Council-Manager system with a Mayor-Council plan on an experimental basis in 2006, and
then on a permanent basis in 2010. Proposition D: Strong Mayor Form of Governance City of
San Diego, SMART VOTER, http://www.smartvoter.org/2010/06/08/ca/sd/prop/D/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2010).
79. SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at xiii, xvi.
80. Id. at 104, 181–83, 191.
81. NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, supra note 68.
82. See, e.g., id.; Adam W. Herbert, The Los Angeles Charter: Lessons of Defeat, 60 NAT’L
CIVIC REV. 603 (1971) (providing a political study of the failed charter process). A range of other
less well-known guides are cited in James M. Harkin, Structural Change and Municipal
Government: The Syracuse Case, 15 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 3 (1983).
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records of a previous (failed) charter reform commission in Los
Angeles were available for our guidance. 83
Generally, charter commissions hire their own staffs and also
draw on city staff, conduct wide-ranging surveys of comparative best
practices, hear testimony and debate, and conduct a thorough review
of the charter itself. 84 Many times, local observers underestimate
such commissions because of their rather quiet beginnings. If it can
reach a consensus, however, the commission tends to get much more
positive support for its recommendations by the end than might be
envisioned at the start. A commission’s odds of success are greatly
enhanced if its leadership is attuned to the political viability of its
proposals. 85
The basic value of a commission model for the California
governance crisis is that it reduces the initial risk of undertaking
reform, while offering the possibility of well-designed reforms that
may build credibility among elites and with the voters. This model is
the converse of the constitutional convention, which stacks its risks
up front. 86 Furthermore, initiating a commission is much easier than
creating a convention. A commission can be established by a
majority vote of the legislature, by the governor, or ideally by both
working together. By contrast, the creation of a constitutional
convention requires action from the voters. 87 The commission model
provides the possibility of developing a long-term culture of
reform—not by promising a magic bullet solution, but by becoming
a credible clearinghouse and evaluator of all possible proposals over
a considerable period of time.
83. L.A. CITY CHARTER COMM’N, CITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE FUTURE (1969). Our staff
located the files of this commission in a long-neglected filing cabinet at city hall.
84. See NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, supra note 68, at 11–12.
85. See Eric Lane, The Practical Lessons of Charter Reform, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW
YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM, supra note 74, at 31–
34.
86. See Joseph Grodin, Popular Sovereignty and Its Limits: Lessons for a Constitutional
Convention in California, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 623 (2011); Ann Lousin, How to Hold a State
Constitutional Convention in the Twenty-First Century, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603 (2011); Steven
Miller, Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention: Legal Questions (Without Answers)
Concerning the People’s Ability to Reform California’s Government Through a Constitutional
Convention, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545 (2011).
87. At the local level, it is somewhat easier to establish an appointed commission than an
elected one, which may require a vote of the people to create it. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2;
Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional
Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1522–23 (2009).
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States have made some use of constitutional reform
commissions. 88 Kelley Armitage describes the commission’s role in
state constitutional reform as “of relatively recent vintage.” 89It is not
uncommon for commissions to do the quiet preparatory work for a
more public convention. 90 In the state of Maryland, a commission set
the table magnificently for the convention, whose final
recommendations the voters nonetheless defeated. 91 I believe that
using commission to set up conventions is backward and that the
commission ought to be front and center rather than a handmaiden to
an unpredictable convention. I propose that California lead with a
commission that may ultimately create the conditions for a
convention. That convention would be more of a mechanism for
evaluating commission proposals than a fundamental decisionmaker. In that sense, this convention would more closely
approximate the original convention model of 1787.
The 1787 U.S. Constitutional Convention created the reputation
of the convention model itself. In our national hagiography,
delegates were sent to Philadelphia, and wisely produced the world’s
most enduring written constitution. 92 However, that constitutional
convention was more like a commission than a convention. For
example, the meeting was not really a decision-making forum, but a
prelude to formal ratification by the states. Conscious of their limited
popular legitimacy and given their stated assignment of “revising”
the Articles of Confederation, the members invented a new
ratification process that was built around real conventions, elected by
the people in each state. 93 And in today’s terms, the members of the
1787 constitutional convention were more like distinguished
commissioners (trustees) than delegates. They included the cream of

88. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 74–75; Cain & Noll, supra note 87, at 1522–23.
89. Kelley H. Armitage, Government Lawyer: Constitution Revision Commissions Avoid
Logrolling, Don’t They?, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1998, at 62; Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 74–75.
90. Kogan, supra note 1, at 1–2.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Thomas Jefferson, who was unable to attend the convention because of his diplomatic
service in Paris, referred to its members as “an assembly of demigods.” NATHAN SCHACHNER,
THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 342 (1st ed. 1957).
93. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”).
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the crop of the nation’s leadership. 94 If ever there was a blue ribbon
commission, this was it.
V. MODELS THAT MIGHT WORK
Two states, Florida and Utah, have established constitutional
revision commissions that might provide models for California. The
Florida Constitution requires the convening of a constitutional
commission every twenty years. 95 Remarkably, the commission has
the power to place amendments directly on the state ballot. 96
The Florida commission consists of the attorney general serving
ex officio and thirty-six additional members, appointed as follows:
fifteen (including the chair of the commission) by the governor; nine
by each of the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of
representatives; and three by the chief justice of the Florida Supreme
Court. 97 The most recent commission served from 1997–1998.
Utah follows a different process. A state constitutional revision
commission was created by law (not by the Utah Constitution) in
1969. 98 In 1977, the commission became a permanent government
feature. 99 The commission consists of the director of the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel ex officio and fifteen
additional members, appointed as follows: three appointed by the
speaker of the house from the house, not more than two from the
same political party; three appointed by the president of the senate
from the senate, not more than two from the same political party;
three appointed by the governor, not more than two from the same
political party; and the six remaining members selected by the
previously listed members, with consideration given to geographical
and bipartisan representation. 100

94. The delegates included James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, and Alexander Hamilton.
The members chose George Washington, the leading figure of the nation, as the convention’s
presiding officer.
95. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Archive Report of Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, UTAH DEP’T OF ADMIN.
SERVS.,
http://archives.state.ut.us/cgi-bin//cathtmljava2.cgi?RUN-WHAT=CATHTML&
TEMPLATE=AGENCY&AGENCY=240 (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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If California were to follow either of these models, the
appointment process would not have to be so dependent on
government officials. Positions could be reserved for members of
credible organizations, such as the League of Women Voters, and
even ordinary citizens. 101 The governor and legislature could start the
process by enacting a law establishing a state constitutional revision
commission. The state could decide at a later time, as did Utah, to
make it permanent. Based on the charter reform experience, it would
be wise to appoint a mixture of well-known, experienced people and
“amateurs” who more closely approximate average Californians.
The value of the commission model is that it reduces the conflict
over reform by removing the process from the elected leadership and
putting a group of citizens in charge. While it may be boring at first,
the commission model allows a formal reform process to begin
without activating a hornet’s nest of opposition. It is, in this sense,
the opposite of the convention model, which is high on excitement
and risk at the outset. There is one type of charter reform
commission that exists in a gray area between commission and
convention—the elected charter reform commission. Under
California state law, the voters may create a charter reform
commission by initiative and elect its members. Then, the
commission’s recommendations go directly to the voters without
passing through the city council. 102 In this respect, an elected
commission is similar to the Florida constitutional commission. In
any case, an elected commission is still likely to be much smaller and
its members better able to deliberate than those of the very large
body that convention advocates favor.
In 1997, the city of Los Angeles undertook an extraordinary
charter reform process that reflected intense conflict between the city
council and Mayor Richard Riordan. 103 The mayor and council
nearly agreed to create a real hybrid commission: an appointed
charter reform commission that could take its recommendations

101. The League of Women Voters mission statement is as follows: “The League of Women
Voters, a nonpartisan political organization, encourages informed and active participation in
government, works to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influences public
policy through education and advocacy.” About the League, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS,
http://www.lwv.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About_Us (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
102. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 34450–34462 (West 2008).
103. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at 85–86.
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directly to the ballot without legislative review. But the deal fell
through, and the mayor withdrew his support. 104 Without the mayor’s
participation, the council created an appointed commission of
twenty-one distinguished and also less well-known citizens. 105 The
mayor then utilized state law to create and finance a ballot initiative
for an elected charter reform commission whose recommendations
would go directly to the ballot. Thus, by 1997, the city had two
competing city charter reform commissions—one appointed and the
other elected—a circumstance possibly without precedent in urban
government. 106
For two years the commissions competed like siblings. And yet,
the Los Angeles charter reform succeeded, in part because of the
interplay between the two models. The appointed commission
provided the intellectual foundation and legitimacy for charter
reform, winning support from key elites and local media for its
process. 107 The elected commission brought popular sovereignty to
the table, including the ability to go around the city council if
necessary. When the two commissions negotiated a unified charter,
the council and mayor were powerless to keep it off the ballot, and it
received over 60 percent of the vote in 1999. 108 Thus, for California,
a composite process of a citizens’ commission followed by a
convention that could examine and ratify its recommendations might
bring the best of both models to the table. 109
In addition to maintaining reform momentum, the commission
model might help with another problem in California’s
government—the lack of expert review of initiatives. There has been
discussion about California’s lack of an indirect initiative and the
impact this absence has had on the quality of ballot measures. 110 The
state legislature’s unpopularity weakens the argument for a
legislative review of ballot measures. An alternative might be to have
104. Id. at 85.
105. See id. at 86–87.
106. Id. at 103.
107. See id. at 89.
108. Id. at 191.
109. A nongovernmental model of this combination may emerge if Repair California, an
organization that favors a convention, and California Forward, an organization that plans to bring
recommendations to the state legislature, were to join forces.
110. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 16–17 (2d ed. 2008).
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a neutral, credible citizens’ commission play the role of review
body. 111 If such a commission were to become a central focus of a
new culture of reform in California, the voters might welcome
having a review body to improve the initiatives on which they vote.
With considerable advance planning, a strategy for a reform
commission can be developed to avoid previous pitfalls and enjoy
the best chance of success.
An argument against a constitutional commission for California
is that California has already tried constitutional reform by
commission—and failed—in the early 1990s. In 1994, the state
legislature created a blue ribbon commission, but when its work was
completed, the legislature largely ignored its recommendations. 112
Successful reform requires a combination of good timing, strong
organization, and political acumen. With considerable advance
planning, a strategy for a reform commission can be developed to
avoid previous pitfalls and enjoy the best chance of success.
Any local charter reformer would see a failed attempt at reform
as a source of lessons for future success rather than as an argument
against another attempt at reform. The odds are always against
reform, but a well-designed mechanism to reduce risk at the outset so
that long-term reform may be possible is well worth the effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
While there is widespread agreement that there is a crisis of
governance in California, there is little consensus as to which
institutional structure would best facilitate useful reform. Although
the idea of a constitutional convention captured the imagination of
the reform community, it failed to generate enough financial and
political support to be implemented. The citizens’ commission,
another model of reform, has been largely ignored. Yet hundreds of
cities successfully used the commission model over the past century
to accomplish reform. Some state constitutional reforms outside
California have successfully used such commissions. The
111. See Bruce E. Cain, Introduction: To Con-Con or Not: California’s Constitutional
Decision, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2010).
112. See Cain & Noll, supra note 1, at 1; see also Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 7
(“California[’s] . . . constitutional revision commission[’s] . . . recommendations never made the
ballot and failed to even get out of the legislature. But the commission left a valuable report that
would guide future commissions.”).
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commission model of governmental reform is much less exciting
than a constitutional convention, but for that very reason it reduces
the initial risk of undertaking such an effort—a risk that is likely to
prove fatal to reform. The low profile of citizens’ commissions
allows a thorough airing of issues and the development of the sort of
credibility that may give its recommendations surprising force.
California should look to Florida and Utah, states in which
permanent constitutional reform commissions have legal standing, as
models of how California might steadily and effectively work toward
a solution in a manner that both reduces the immediate political risk
to all affected interests and leaves open the chance for long-term
reform.

